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The Country Music Television Dispute: An
Illustration of the Tensions Between
Canadian Cultural Protectionism and
American Entertainment Exports
Andrew M. Carlson
The United States is the dominant producer and exporter of
entertainment and popular culture throughout the world.' The
largest 2 and arguably most important trading partner of the
United States, in entertainment as well as other goods and serv-
ices, is Canada. Like many other countries, Canada is fearful
that American culture and entertainment will displace its own
national culture and weaken its entertainment industries. In
response to this fear, Canada has implemented subsidies, dis-
criminatory taxes and tax deductions, and quotas against Amer-
ican cultural imports. Canada has also excluded entertainment
goods and services from its responsibilities under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the central trade
agreement binding it and the United States.3 Furthermore,
Canada, aligned with many other countries, has excluded cul-
l. Canadian Ambassador to the United States Raymond Chr~tien re-
cently asserted that the contents of more than 64% of television programs, 60%
of books, 90% of records, and 94% of films present in Canada originated abroad,
almost entirely in the United States. Canadian Ambassador Defends Curbs on
Imports of U.S. Magazines, TV Shows, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 178
(Jan. 25, 1995). See generally David Rieff, The Culture That Conquered the
Earth: Why Conformist Consumerism is America's Greatest Export, WASH.
POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at C1.
2. Donald S. Macdonald, The Canadian Cultural Industries Exemption
Under Canada-U.S. Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S.L.J. 253 (1994). In 1989, "$200
billion worth of goods and services flowed between the two nations [Canada and
the United States]. In that same year, shipments from the U.S. to Canada ac-
counted for more than 20% of the value of all U.S. exports of merchandise and
nearly equalled total U.S. exports to the European Community." Stephen R.
Konigsberg, Note, Think Globally, Act Locally: North American Free Trade, Ca-
nadian Cultural Industry Exemption, and the Liberalization of the Broadcast
Ownership Laws, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 283 (1994), citing U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement Biennial Report, available in 1991 WL 329550,
at *1 (Jan. 1991).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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tural industries from the agreements under the administration
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 4 the principal interna-
tional multilateral trade organization.
Although the United States and Canada are firm allies and
generally maintain a cordial trade relationship, these cultural
exemptions threaten to undermine trade cooperation between
the two countries. The tensions between open trade and cul-
tural protectionism that affect both countries were recently il-
lustrated by a dispute arising from the Canadian government's
refusal to allow Country Music Television (CMT), an American
country music-video channel, to continue to operate in Canada.
Part I of this Note summarizes the historical and legal back-
ground of this dispute. Part II details the chronology of the
CMT dispute itself. Part HI analyzes the claims made by both
the United States and Canada, uses those claims to illustrate
the problems inherent in the system of existing agreements with
regard to cultural trade, and examines arguments both for and
against limiting cultural trade, with a view towards developing
policies to balance the needs of all countries. This Note con-
cludes that as cultural trade tensions continue to grow in impor-
tance, the lessons that can be learned from the CMT dispute can
be applied to the benefit of both the United States and its trad-
ing partners.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP
The United States and Canada are intimately linked by ties
of history, geography, and trade. Both are former colonies of
England and are wealthy, industrialized nations with abundant
natural resources. Canada and the United States share the
longest unprotected national border in the world, 5 and more
than 80 percent of the Canadian population lives within 100 ki-
lometers of that border.6 This population distribution makes
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, December 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994). The 1994 Uruguay Round of
trade agreements culminated in the creation of the WTO. The WTO's charter
incorporates its predecessor, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), as well as other major agreements made during the Uruguay Round.
5. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Biennial Report, available in 1991
WL 329550, at *1 (Jan. 1991).
6. John Herd Thompson, Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Pro-
tection, Promotion, and Popular Culture, in NoRm AMamCA WITHOUT BoP-
DERS? 269, 271 (Stephen J. Randall et al. eds., 1992).
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the vast majority of Canadian consumers easily accessible to
American exporters, whether of products or of cultural services
such as television broadcasts. As a result, Canada is uniquely
susceptible to American cultural exports.
For some time, there has been a movement in Canada to
identify and nurture Canadian culture.7 This movement is de-
rived from policies, common to most governments, that attempt
to foster national pride, sovereignty, and cultural achievement.
For example, the Massey Report,8 written in 1949, strongly
urged the creation of a Canadian Council for the Arts, because
*.. it is desirable that the Canadian people should know as much as
possible about their country, its history and traditions; and about their
national life and common achievements... [and] it is in the national
interest to give encouragement to institutions which express national
feeling, promote common understanding and add to the variety and
richness of Canadian life.9
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American cultural indus-
tries such as film, television, and popular music experienced
dramatic growth. There was a corresponding rise in the export
of American entertainment and culture.' 0 During those de-
cades, the Canadian government made its first attempts to nur-
ture its domestic culture and entertainment industries by
protecting them from American competition." These efforts
culminated in the Broadcasting Act of 1968,12 and the creation
of a Federal agency, the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).13 The CRTC issues
broadcast licenses and oversees Canada's centralized communi-
7. See generally id.
8. The Massey Report was the product of the Royal Commission on Na-
tional Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, chaired by the Right
Honourable Vincent Massey, Chancellor of the University of Toronto. Konigs-
berg, supra note 2, at 290. The creation of this commission was the first major
postwar step taken by the Canadian government to create a framework linking
the desire to preserve Canadian culture to a strong governmental policy. Id.
9. Id., citing ROYAL COMMSSION ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARTS,
LETTERS, AND SCIENCES (1949-1951) (Can.), at xi-xii.
10. Id. at 291.
11. See id. for a detailed overview and history of the U.S.-Canada cultural
trade relationship.
12. Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., ch. B-11 (1985) (Can.).
13. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-22 (1985) (Can.). The CRTC was originally named the Canadian
Radio-Television Commission, but was soon renamed the Canadian Radio-Tele-
vision and Telecommunications Commission. Konigsberg, supra note 2, at 292
n.78.
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cations network, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(CBC). 14
B. CANADIAN PROTECTIONIST MEASURES
Among the tools the CRTC has used to protect Canada from
the perceived onslaught of American culture are subsidies and
tax measures. For example, until 1987, any investment in a Ca-
nadian-produced film was 100 percent tax-deductible. 15 An-
other tax measure, known as Bill C-58,16 denies advertising cost
deductions for Canadian businesses that attempt to reach their
domestic market by advertising in non-Canadian media. Total
Canadian direct and indirect federal arts subsidies in 1989-1990
were estimated to be Canadian $2.93 billion.17
Perhaps the two most important policies the CRTC has im-
plemented to protect Canada from American entertainment are
its restrictions on foreign ownership and on broadcast content.
Until recently, broadcast entities such as television and radio
stations and cable television providers doing business in Canada
had to be at least 80 percent Canadian owned.' 8 Canadian tele-
vision and radio broadcasters are subject to "Canadian content"
restrictions: 60 percent of all programming and 50 percent of all
prime time programming must be of Canadian origin.' 9
Canada's protectionist stance toward cultural imports
manifests itself in the key trade agreements to which Canada is
a signatory, NAFTA and the WTO agreements. Although
NAFTA generally discourages the use of quotas and other trade
restrictions, it contains an exemption for cultural industries.
Annex 2106 of NAFTA provides that "any measure adopted or
14. -Subject to this Act,... the Commission shall regulate and supervise
all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system." Broadcasting Act, supra note
12, § 15.
15. This measure, called the 100% Capital Cost Allowance, is discussed in
STEVEN GLOBERMAN, CULTURAL RFGULATION IN CANADA 12-14 (1983). In 1987,
the deductible amount was reduced to 30%. Susan Walker, Sinking Arts
Groups Send SOS to New Government, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 23, 1993, at L15
available in 1993 WL 7284952.
16. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch.1, § 19 (1985, 5th Supp.) (Can.). This re-
striction was the subject of a Section 301 action initiated in 1978. See infra
notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
17. Walker, supra note 15, at L15.
18. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission: An
FM Policy for the Nineties, Pub. Notice 1990-111, C. Gaz. pt. I, at 455 (Can.)
(1990). The current limit, enacted in April 1996, is 67%. See infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
19. Television Broadcasting Regulations, SOR/87-49, C. Gaz. pt. II, at 339
(Can.) (1987).
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maintained with respect to cultural industries,... and any mea-
sure of equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be
governed under this Agreement exclusively in accordance with
the provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment" (FTA).20 FTA Art. 2012's definition of "cultural indus-
tries" includes the publication, distribution, or sale of books,
magazines, periodicals, newspapers, films, video recordings, au-
dio or video music recordings, and sheet music, as well as all
radio, television, cable, and satellite broadcasting services. 21
Article 2005 states that "[ciultural industries are exempt from
the provisions of the [FTA]" (and by incorporation, NAFTA). 22
NAFTA thus allows Canada to construct trade barriers to cul-
tural services and products. 23
The original GATT included an exception for screen quotas
imposed on movie theaters, 24 but otherwise did not mention cul-
tural products. There has been much debate over whether and
how cultural products were covered under GATT, 25 most of
which was resolved in 1994 with the creation and adoption of
the Uruguay Round WTO/GATT agreements, which included
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 26 and the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
20. NAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 2106.
21. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988,
Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281, art. 2012 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].
22. Id. art. 2005.
23. Konigsberg, supra note 2, at 299.
24. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. IV.
25. See, e.g., Laurence G.C. Kaplan, Comment, The European Community's
"Television Without Frontiers' Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Cul-
ture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255, 307-44 (1994); Timothy M. Lupinacci, Note,
The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the European Community:
Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
113, 131-42, (1991); Michael Braun & Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consum-
able Product or Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENY. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 155, 178-91 (1993); Jon Filipek, "Culture Quotas": The Trade Contro-
versy Over the European Community's Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 323, 345-62 (1992); Hale E. Hedley, Canadian Cultural Policy and the
NAFTA: Problems Facing the U.S. Copyright Industries, 28 GEo. WASH. J. IN'L
L. & ECON. 655, 682-83 (1995); Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Televi-
sion Programming and GATT: An Analysis of Why the European Community's
Local Program Requirement Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 97 (1993).
26. General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [here-
inafter GATS].
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(TRIPS).27 Although GATS and TRIPS arguably cover certain
sectors of the group of industries generally agreed to be "cul-
tural," the WTO has no general provision concerning cultural
products as a whole. Reasoning that anything not expressly pro-
hibited is allowed, many WTO members consider themselves le-
gally free to apply quotas and other trade restrictions to protect
their domestic cultural industries. For example, just a week af-
ter the Uruguay Round ended, the French Senate approved a
new requirement that French radio stations devote 40% of air
time to French music, and Spain's Parliament passed a new law
requiring one-fourth to one-third of all movies shown in Spanish
theaters be of European origin.28
C. AMERICAN RESPONSES TO CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM
The U.S. government's primary tool in combating foreign
measures that exclude U.S. exports of entertainment and cul-
ture is contained in the 1974 Trade Act.29 Section 301 of that
Act 30 contains two main provisions: 301(a), which allows the Of-
fice of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to take retaliatory
action if a trading partner breaks a trade agreement with the
United States; and 301(b), which does not require the breach of
a trade agreement, but instead allows the USTR to take retalia-
tory action if the trading partner's actions are "unreasonable" or
"discriminatory" and also "burden or restrict United States com-
merce."31 Section 301 thus vests extremely broad discretion in
the USTR. Section 301 claims are generally initiated by Ameri-
can citizens who make a complaint to the USTR, which then in-
vestigates the complaint and decides what action to take.32 The
United States can use Section 301 measures either indepen-
27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31;
33 LL.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
28. Roger Cohen, France and Spain Impose Quotas, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22,
1993, at C15.
29. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1994).
30. Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1994).
31. Id. §§ 2411(a)(1), 2411(b)(1). There are two other types of Section 301
action: "Special 301" and "Super 301." Id. §§ 2242, 2420. Special 301 is used
when foreign countries deny American companies the market protection associ-
ated with intellectual property rights, and Super 301 is designed to force the
Executive Branch to self-initiate Section 301 actions against "priority" nations.
Because these provisions are applicable only within certain circumstances that
do not concern disputes over cultural industries, they are not within the scope
of this Note.
32. Id. §§ 2412-20.
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dently or in conjunction with remedies available under interna-
tional trade agreements.
A second U.S. response to a perceived trade problem is
through NAFTA. A Canadian measure could either be directed
explicitly at limiting cultural imports into Canada, or could have
the effect of restricting cultural trade, although enacted for a
purpose that is putatively unrelated to culture. For example, a
Canadian statute that banned, ostensibly for environmental rea-
sons, the sale of magazines without recycled, non-glossy covers
has a goal that is unrelated to cultural trade. Because nearly all
American magazines have glossy covers, this measure would ef-
fectively prohibit the import into Canada of American
magazines. In this case, if the Canadian measure breached
some other aspect of NAFTA, the United States could combat
the measure through NAFTA.33 The United States would effec-
tively be fighting to continue its cultural exports through the
machinery of NAFTA, even though cultural industries are ex-
pressly excluded from NAFTA (through the FTA).
If the Canadian measure had been designed specifically to
discriminate against American cultural imports, as allowed
under the NAFTA/FTA cultural exemption, the United States
could retaliate via Article 2005(2) of the FTA: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take meas-
ures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that
would have been inconsistent with this Agreement."3 4 These
measures are not otherwise limited, and thus a Section 301 ac-
tion that was of "equivalent commercial effect" against Cana-
dian cultural industries seems to be implicitly allowed by the
FTA.
Third, the United States may pursue a remedy for a trade
grievance under the WTO agreements. There are several GATT
provisions that allow a member to withdraw concessions or
otherwise respond to a trade problem.3 5 GATT Article XXIII
provides that if the United States (or any other member of
GATT) considers that the benefits it derives from being a mem-
ber of the WTO are being "nullified or impaired" by another
member's actions, whether or not those actions actually violate
the agreement, it may take steps to retaliate.36 Any dispute
33. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 20.
34. FTA, supra note 21, art. 2005(2).
35. Two examples are Article XI, which provides remedies for "dumping,"
and Article XIX, which provides for emergency actions to prevent serious injury
to domestic producers. GATI' arts. XI and XIX.
36. Id. art. XXIII:(a)-(c).
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that arises under Article XXIII is settled through the formalized
dispute procedure codified in the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).3 7 Action via Article XXIII and the DSU is simi-
lar to action via Section 301, in that the United States could
respond to a Canadian protectionist measure through GATT
even if the measure did not violate any specific agreement be-
tween the two countries. However, unlike section 301 actions,
responses through the WTO may be somewhat lengthy and
time-consuming, in spite of the improvements made by adopting
the DSU.3s Section 301 procedures, because they are unilateral,
can be relatively quick.
A fourth remedy for redressing international trade wrongs
is simply a lawsuit, in either country involved. Depending on
the laws of the country in which the suit is brought, an Ameri-
can person, corporation, or the U.S. government may make a
claim for a tort (such as damages arising from unfair trade prac-
tices) or breach of contract (such as an implied contract of good-
faith dealing) against a foreign entity or government. The avail-
ability and success of this remedy vary widely, depending on the
circumstances of the case.
Finally, multinational companies do not have to take formal
action at all-they can just conduct their business so as to
achieve their ends without governmental assistance or interfer-
ence. This type of action can range from purchasing decisions
and other ordinary business activity to boycotts and public rela-
tions campaigns that are calculated to have a retributive effect
on an international competitor.
11. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY MUSIC
TELEVISION DISPUTE
The CMT dispute began in February 1994, when the CRTC
began holding hearings to allot an undetermined number of ad-
37. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND
vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSUI.
38. The sum of the maximum times allotted for each of the several stages of
a DSU action is approximately 31 months. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 341-44 (3d ed.
1995). By contrast, the maximum time allowable between initiation and imple-
mentation of a Section 301 action is under 14 months. Section 301, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2412(a)(2), 2414(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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ditions to Canadian cable broadcasting service.3 9 CMT was one
of forty-eight applicants, many of which had already been broad-
casting in various parts of Canada.40 CMT began operations in
Canada in 1984, and in 1994 it had 464 system affiliates and
approximately 1.9 million subscribers there.41 At the hearings,
Canadian broadcasters alleged that CMT would directly com-
pete against their proposed channels 42 and did not adequately
feature Canadian country musicians.43 A total of seven broad-
casters4" applied to operate country music channels, and it
seemed clear that the CRTC would decide that there was only
enough room on Canadian cable for one channel in a country
music format.45
On June 6, 1994, the CRTC announced its decision: CMT
was dropped from Canadian cable and the CRTC instead de-
cided to license a similar, brand-new channel (New Country Net-
work, or NCN) offered by Canadian programmer MH Radio/
39. Barbara Wickens, Special Pleadings: The CRTC Screens Proposals for
Television's New Frontier, MAcLEAN'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 64.
40. Id.
41. Janet Stilson, Canadian Commission Forces Systems to Drop CMT,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, June 20, 1994, at 12.
42. Country Music Television Inc. v. CRTC et al. [1994] 178 N.R. 386, 389.
43. Spence Bozak, president of Canada's Country Music Channel, one of
CMT's competitors, testified at the CRTC hearings that there was a big differ-
ence between Canadian and American country music, and that "[aln the artists
we talked to said, 'We just want our music exposed to Canadians.'" Wickens,
supra note 39, at 66.
44. The seven included five Canadian applicants plus CMT and The Nash-
ville Network (TNN), which was also already established in Canada. Id. Until
recently, CMT was a joint venture between Nashville-based country-music in-
dustry giant Gaylord Entertainment (owner of the Grand Ole Opry, Opryland
Convention Center, and Acuff-Rose Music Publishing) and Group W Satellite
Communications (GWSC), a division of Westinghouse (owner of the CBS televi-
sion network and manufacturer of everything from refrigerators to nuclear
power plants). See GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, INC., 1995 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 40 (1996); WESTINGHOUSE, INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1996). TNN,
owned wholly (at the time) by Gaylord, differs from CMT in that CMT broad-
casts almost entirely country-music videos, whereas TNN broadcasts "country-
lifestyle" programming, such as line-dancing, fishing, and motor sports shows.
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT, supra at 13-15, 40. In early February 1997, West-
inghouse announced that it was buying TNN and CMT from Gaylord for $1.55
billion in Westinghouse stock. Geraldine Fabrikant, Westinghouse to Buy
Country Music Units, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at C5.
45. Even though there were proposals for 48 different channels, ranging
from a pay-per-view hockey channel to all-animation channels, most cable car-
riers in Canada had only the capacity to carry six additional channels. Wick-
ens, supra note 39, at 6 This made it unlikely that more than one channel in
any given format would be allowed. Eventually, a total of seven new channels
were allowed. Joanne Ingrassia, Canada Limits TV Investors, ELECTRONIC ME-
DIA, Jan. 23, 1995, at 159.
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Rawlco.46 Even though Canadian regulations stated a prefer-
ence for mostly Canadian programming and suggested that for-
eign services would face cancellation if similar programming
could be provided by a Canadian company, CMT said it was "dis-
turbed" by what it called a "perplexing" CRTC decision.47 CMT
was the only American channel that was forced to stop broad-
casting in Canada as a result of the CRTC's decision. 48
On July 4, CMT applied for leave to appeal in Canada's Fed-
eral Court of Appeal. 49 It intended to fight the Commission's
decision on the grounds that the CRTC denied CMT an opportu-
nity to be heard on a matter directly affecting CMT's interests
when it denied CMT's request to participate in public hearings,
and failed to consider all of the relevant information in making
its decision. 50
On August 26, Canada's Federal Court of Appeal granted
CMT leave to appeal the CRTC's decision. 51 If the court agreed
that CMT was denied its "natural justice," CMT could present
its case before the CRTC again.52 The appeal hearing was held
on November 22, 1994, and on December 20, the court dismissed
46. CRTC Decision 94-284, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3047-48 (Can.) (1994);
CRTC Public Notices 1994-60, 61-1, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3035-39 (Can.) (1994).
Because CMT would, in the CRTC's view, directly compete against NCN, the
CRTC placed CMT on a list of discretionary cable television services until the
end of 1994, at which time it would be removed from the list of services that
were eligible for broadcast at all. CRTC Decision 94-284, supra. At the same
time, NCN was placed on the newly expanded list of basic cable television serv-
ices. CRTC Public Notice 1994-60, supra at 3036.
47. International Cable, WARREN'S CABLE Ro. MONITOR, June 20, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 8368290.
48. Stilson, supra note 41, at 12. In past CRTC actions, U.S. channels had
been allowed to continue broadcasting even when Canadian competitors
debuted, apparently because they were not challenged. James Careless, CMT
Fights Being Booted off Canadian Cable, MULTICHANNEL NEws, July 11, 1994,
at 14. For example, CNN remained in Canada after CBC Newsworld was li-
censed, as did Arts & Entertainment Network (A&E) when Canadian-owned
Bravo was launched. Id. Because TNN, CMTs sister channel, was apparently
not directly competitive with NCN or any other Canadian basic cable service,
its Canadian broadcasting status remained unchallenged.
49. Careless, supra note 48, at 14.
50. Id.
51. Music Notes, BILLBOARD, Sept. 8, 1994.
52. Id. "Natural justice" is roughly analogous to procedural due process in
American constitutional and administrative law. Compare DONNA SOBLE KAuF-
MAN, BROADCASTING LAw IN CANADA: FAINESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
7, (1987) (describing natural justice), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (applying procedural due process in an administrative setting).
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CMT's appeal.53 The court held that since its entry into the Ca-
nadian market in 1984, CMT had been on notice that it could
become ineligible to broadcast if a similar Canadian service be-
came competitive with it.54 The court held further that since
CMT had been given a reasonable opportunity to state its case to
the CRTC, natural justice had not been denied.55 On December
29, 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada denied CMT's applica-
tion to appeal the Appellate Court's ruling.56
A few days earlier, on December 23, CMT had filed a peti-
tion with the USTR alleging that the CRTC's action violated
NAFTA by limiting market access to service providers, confiscat-
ing investments, and generally discriminating against U.S.
firms.5 7 CMT argued that if the unfair practices were not reme-
died, the United States could take retaliatory action, including
restrictions on imports of goods and services from Canada.5 8
CMT's petition also asked the USTR to initiate a Section
301 action.59 At the same time, CMT instituted a boycott of all
Canadian country music artists on all of its broadcast outlets.60
For the purposes of this boycott, CMT defined "Canadian" coun-
try musicians as any who did not have contracts with American
record companies, thus allowing itself to continue to play videos
by already popular country musicians who were from Canada. 61
During the same period, other disputes based on cultural
exports from the United States to Canada had flared up, includ-
ing a new tax on American magazines sold in Canada.62 On De-
cember 22, 1994, the USTR released a dispatch responding to
Canada's actions. 63 In it, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor stated that the U.S. government was "examining all of
53. Country Music Television Inc. v. CRTC [1994] 178 N.R. 386, 387; CMT
Protests Eviction from Canada, ELEcTRoNic MEDIA, Jan. 2, 1995, at 50.
54. Country Music Television Inc. v. CRTC [1994] 178 N.R. 386, 391.
55. Id. at 390.
56. Id. at 400.
57. CMT Fights Back Against CRTC: Petitions U.S. Trade Rep., CABLEFAX,
Dec. 23, 1994, available in 1994 WL 11049381. It is unclear exactly which
NAFTA provisions CMT thought Canada's actions had violated. See infra notes
100-15 and accompanying text.
58. CMT Fights Back, supra note 57.
59. CMT Protests Eviction, supra note 53.
60. Etan Vlessing Now, Ousted CMT Gives Canadian Vids the Boot,
HoLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 12, 1995.
61. Id.
62. New Canadian Tax Initiative Targets 'Split-Run' Magazines; USTR
Concerned, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.1, at 15 (Jan. 4, 1995).
63. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Response to Recent Canadian
Trade-Related Decisions, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 21 (1995).
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its options, including retaliation options, to appropriately re-
spond to these unacceptable developments." This was a strongly
worded hint that the United States would institute punitive
measures (most likely a Section 301 action) aimed at Canadian
entertainment industry companies operating in the United
States.64 Soon after, Kantor indicated that his office was initiat-
ing the Section 301 trade investigation and invited public com-
ments on how the CRTC policy had harmed U.S. interests. 65
In response, U.S. entertainment conglomerate and CMT co-
owner Westinghouse, along with several other American cable
broadcasters, urged the federal government to impose annual
penalties of $750 million against Canada in retaliation for dis-
criminating against CMT.66 Kantor set a June 21 deadline for
resolution of the dispute, threatening to compile a "hit list" of
Canadian entertainment companies that would suffer retalia-
tion.67 Observers suggested that a "bona fide trade war" was
erupting between the United States and Canada. 68
The impending "trade war" was averted on June 22, 1995,
when CMT and NCN agreed to form a joint venture to run a
single Canadian country music network. 69 CMT would own
twenty percent of the new network (the maximum foreign own-
ership allowed under Canadian law), 70 which was to be called
"CMT: Country Music Television (Canada)."71 The remaining
eighty percent would be held by MH Radio/Rawlco, the original
owners of NCN. 72 However, if the Canadian restrictions that
kept foreign ownership of broadcasters below twenty percent
64. Id.
65. USTR Initiates Section 301 Probe of Canada TV Communications Prac-
tices, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 267 (Feb. 8, 1995).
66. U.S. Entertainment Firms Call for Retaliation Against Canada, 12 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 504 (Mar. 15, 1995). One of the firms urging retali-
ation was The Weather Channel (TWC). A few months earlier, TWC's Cana-
dian counterpart, M6t6om~dia/Weather Now, had requested that TWC become
ineligible to broadcast in Canada, just as CMT had. CRTC Public Notice 1994-
125, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I (Can.) (1994).
67. Michael Burgi, Sabers Rattle in Row over Country Music; Canada's
Ban on U.S. Cable Channel Leads to Threats from Washington, ADWEEK, May
29, 1995, at 12.
68. Id.; see also U.S., Canada out of Tune over CMT, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 5, 1995, at 27; Music Compromise, MAcL N's, July 1, 1995, at 60;
Justin Martin, Truce Declared in the Canadian Country Music War, FORTUNE,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 126.
69. Tentative Accord Reached On Dispute With Canada Over Revoking
CMT's License, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1088 (June 28, 1995).
70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
71. Tentative Accord Reached, supra note 69.
72. Id.
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were eased to allow thirty-three percent foreign control, NCN
would sell an additional thirteen percent stake to CMT.73
Nevertheless, in January 1996, there was still friction be-
tween the Canadian owners and CMT, which claimed that it
was being prohibited from participating in the management of
the channel. 74 CMT again asked Mickey Kantor for help, claim-
ing that its Canadian partners had exhibited bad faith, and re-
questing that Kantor find the Canadian ownership restrictions
unreasonable and take retaliatory measures. 75 As February 6,
1996, (the statutory deadline for the original Section 301 action)
approached, Kantor hinted that if a settlement was not soon
reached, the retaliatory measures would go into effect. 76 How-
ever, on February 6, Kantor declined to announce retaliatory ac-
tion, noting that negotiations between the parties seemed to be
on track.77 Finally, on March 7, CMT announced that it had
reached an agreement with its Canadian partners. 78 On April
11, the Canadian government announced the relaxation of its
foreign ownership rules, permitting foreign business entities to
purchase up to one-third of the voting shares of a Canadian
holding company in the television, radio, and cable television
industries. 79
Finally, on August 8, 1996, after more than two years of tur-
moil, acting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene BarshefskyS°
73. Music Compromise, supra note 68, at 60. The loosening of the foreign
investment provision, see infra note 79 and accompanying text, was presumably
already being negotiated at that time.
74. Michael BUrgi, CMT Seeks Canada Links, MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 15, 1996,
at 5.
75. Id.; Rich Brown, Group W Dispute with Canada Heats up, BROADCAST-
ING & CABLE, Jan. 15, 1996, at 130.
76. Retaliation is Threatened Over Canada's Limitations on the Broadcast-
ing of U.S. Radio and TV Programs, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVEsMmENT REP.,
Feb. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175250.
77. USTR Says Canada Broadcast Policies Discriminate; CMT Talks Con-
tinue, 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 244 (Feb. 14, 1996).
78. CMT Makes Canada Connection, MEDIAWEEK, Mar. 11, 1996, at 3;
Country Music TV Dispute Resolved; U.S., Canadian Firms Finalize Deal, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 421 (Mar. 13, 1996).
79. Direction to the CRTC (Ineligibility of Non-Canadians) SOR/96-192,
130 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 1296, 1299 (Can.) (1996); Canda Eases Foreign Owner-
ship Limits on Broadcasting, Cable TV Holding Firms, 13 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 16, at 646 (Apr. 17, 1996).
80. Mickey Kantor became U.S. Secretary of Commerce on April 13, 1996,
and his assistant, Charlene Barshefsky, became acting USTR immediately
thereafter. Paul Blustein, Clinton Expected to Name Barshefsky to Trade Post,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at El. Barshefsky was confirmed as USTR by the
Senate on March 5, 1997. Paul Blustein, Barshefsky Confirmed by Senate; Vote
on Trade Offiicial Spurs Angry Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1997, at E2.
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announced that CMT and its Canadian partners had received
final regulatory approval to begin broadcasting in Canada and
had been issued a broadcast license good until 2000.81 However,
she warned that the United States would closely monitor Can-
ada's actions regarding cultural industries, and the U.S. admin-
istration would "not tolerate discrimination against any U.S.
industry."8 2
III. ANALYSIS
A. RESPONSES TO CANADA'S EXCLUSION OF CMT
As outlined above, there were five avenues through which
the United States and CMT could have responded to the CRTC's
decision: the GATr/WTO system, NAFTA/FTA, Section 301, a
lawsuit in Canadian court, and an independent private action.
Because an intensive inquiry into Canadian administrative law
would be outside the scope of this Note, it will be assumed that
the CRTC's hearing and the Canadian legal decisions on appeal
were procedurally and legally correct.
An examination of the CMT dispute under GATT, NAFTA,
and Section 301 is the first step in an investigation of cultural
trade exclusion policy in general. Responses involving two of
these were threatened but not used: CMT alleged that the deci-
sion violated NAFTA, and the USTR threatened Section 301 ac-
tion. Redress under the WTO/GATT system was neither used
nor even mentioned by any party to the dispute. These three
means of redress will be discussed in ascending order of their
possible effectiveness.
1. GATT/WTO
At no point in the dispute did either CMT or the United
States attempt to argue that the CRTC's action violated any
GATT/WTO agreement. It would not have been surprising if the
United States had made this argument, though, because it and
other countries have been engaged in an ongoing debate over the
status of cultural industries under the GATT/WTO system.8 3
The first issue in the debate over whether the CRTC's de-
nial of CMT's license is actionable under a WTO agreement is
81. Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Country Network to Begin Broadcasting in Can-
ada This Fall, Ending Long Trade Dispute, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at
1304 (Aug. 14, 1996).
82. Id.
83. See generally supra note 25.
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whether cable television broadcasting is considered to be a good
or a service. If cable television is a good, then it is covered by
GATT and the United States could respond to the CRTC's action
by instituting a non-violation "nullification or impairment" pro-
ceeding under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 4
Although this course of action has its uncertainties, 85 it does
provide a dispute resolution system that is procedurally predict-
able and that, whatever the outcome, is likely to be adhered to
by all concerned.
If cable television broadcasting is a service, it is covered
under GATS, which contains a more limited non-violation nulli-
fication and impairment provision.8 6 In prior disputes over cul-
tural regulations (primarily. with the EC), the United States has
attempted to claim that television programming and broadcast-
ing are goods and, as such, are governed by GATT. For example,
when the EC passed its "Television without Frontiers" directive
in 1989, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously re-
nounced the directive, calling it "GATT-illegal" and requesting
the USTR to take action against the EC through GATT (and Sec-
tion 301) on the basis that television programming constituted a
good, not a service. 87
However, since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, it can
no longer be plausibly argued that cable television broadcasting
is anything but a service. The simplest and most persuasive evi-
dence of this is that the general list of services covered by GATS
includes "Radio and television transmission services," which cer-
84. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
85. Two large groups of problems with the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
system have been identified: those that arise from the general structure and
historical background of the GATT and those that arise from changes made
during the Uruguay Round. The first group of problems include: (1) disuse, (2)
delays in the establishment of panels, (3) delays in appointing specific panel
members, (4) delays in the completion of panel reports, (5) uncertain quality
and neutrality of panelists and panel reports, (6) blocked panel reports, and (7)
non-implementation of panel reports. JACKSON, supra note 38, at 344-45, sum-
marizing William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
51, 81-89 (1987). All of these problems continue to persist even after the adop-
tion of the 1994 Uruguay Round improvements, and have been complemented
by the problems particular to those improvements, such as major powers' possi-
ble non-compliance with adverse decisions and uncertainty about the effect and
role of the new Appellate Body. JACKSON, supra note 38, at 345.
86. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
87. Lupinacci, supra note 25, at 128-29, 134, and n.103, citing 135 CONG.
Rac. H7330 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frenzel); see also
Filipek, supra note 25, at 355-57; Smith, supra note 25, at 123-27.
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tainly describes cable television broadcasting.88 Furthermore,
there is strong precedent in Canadian,8 9 U.S.,9 ° and interna-
tional law91 that cable broadcasting is a service. 92 Thus, the
WTO agreement governing the CMT dispute is GATS, not
GATT.
GATS, although similar in structure to GATT, has some
major differences. While GATT is founded on both the principles
of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 93 and national treatment,94
GATS has a MFN requirement but no general national treat-
ment requirement. In other words, although the CRTC's actions
distinguish between Canadian and foreign broadcasters, they
are GATS-legal because they do not distinguish between U.S.
broadcasters and other foreign broadcasters. However, GATS
does contain a limited national treatment requirement. Part III
of GATS, titled Specific Commitments, requires national treat-
ment for measures that have been specified in each member's
88. BERNARD HOEKMAN, WORLD BANK, TENTATIVE FIRST STEPS: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SERVICES 37-38 (1994).
89. See, e.g., Attorney General of Canada v. Lount Corp. [1985] 2 F.C. 185,
197 (Can.) (holding that "television service, provided for the guests [of a hotel] is
akin to the provision of heating, water, linens, furniture, towels and soap, and
elevator service.") (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 442, (1991) ("[plaintifiM
brought this class action ... to challenge the extension of the sales tax to cable
television services") (emphasis added); Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (1994) (defining a "cable system" as "a facility... that
is designed to provide cable service ... to multiple subscribers within a commu-
nity.. . .") (emphasis added).
91. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 427 (E.C.J.), 14 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
177, 201-02 (1974) (holding that "a television signal must, by reason of its na-
ture, be regarded as a provision of services .... It follows that the transmission
of television signals . . . comes, as such, within the rules . . . relating to
services").
92. This conclusion, although accurate in the case of CMT, does not neces-
sarily apply to all sectors of all cultural industries. For example, magazines
and compact discs are clearly goods, not services. Television programming, as
distinguished from television broadcasting, may also be a good. Thus, although
GATS governs the CMT dispute, GATT or TRIPS may govern future disputes
about films, magazines, records, and television, depending on the exact issues of
each case. Notwithstanding this, most of the controversy over cultural protec-
tion has been, so far, over the means of distribution. Content and investment
quotas have mostly been used by importing countries to control the means of
dissemination of entertainment, not to control the importation of the physical
media on which the entertainment is carried. Thus, it is useful to assume the
commodity in question is a service, rather than a product, when examining cul-
tural trade policy in general.
93. GATP art. I.
94. Id. art. III.
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Schedule. 95 Canada has not put its broadcast regulations in its
Schedule, 96 so national treatment is not required in regard to its
broadcast regulations under any WTO agreements. Even if na-
tional treatment were required, non-violation "nullification and
impairment" dispute resolution through the Dispute Settlement
Understanding is available under GATS only for those services
that are listed in each party's Schedule.97 Thus, the United
States can make no claim that the CRTC's decision was GATS-
illegal, and there is no means by which it can make an "equita-
ble" claim that although the CRTC's decision was GATS-legal, it
still impaired benefits they might have reasonably expected
under GATS.
The futility of a United States response to the CMT dispute
through WTO/GATT agreements is augmented by several other
disadvantages that might be present even if there were a way
for the United States to bring this dispute before the WTO.
WTO Dispute Settlement proceedings can be lengthy and bu-
reaucratically complex. 98 Furthermore, presenting this dispute
in front of the whole WTO might cause other countries and trade
organizations, particularly the EC, to get involved. The United
States and the EC have a long and contentious history of dealing
with cultural trade issues,99 and it is unlikely that the EC in-
volvement would do anything except ensure that the WTO pro-
ceedings would become longer, more complex, and less
predictable. In sum, the CRTC's exclusion of CMT is "legal"
within the GATT/WTO system, and even if it were not, the
GATT/WTO system would not be the most effective forum in
which to settle this particular bilateral dispute between the
United States and Canada.
2. NAFTA
In its December 23, 1994 petition to the USTR, CMT alleged
that the CRTC's decision violated NAFTA.100 Although CMT
never identified exactly which provisions of NAFTA it had in
mind, it alleged that Canada had "unfairly discriminate[d]
95. GATS art. XVI:1.
96. GATT SECRETARIAT, 28 URUGUAY RouND oF MuLTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS, (1994).
97. GATS art. XXIII.
98. See supra note 85.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see generally Kaplan, supra
note 25.
100. See CMT Fights Back, supra note 57 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing CMT's intention to file a petition).
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against U.S. firms" 10 1 by violating NAFTA "provisions that deal
with market access for service providers and confiscation of
investments."10 2
Whatever CMT's arguments may have been, the CRTC's ex-
clusion of CMT was indisputably within Canada's prerogatives
under NAFTA. As discussed above,' 03 NAFTA Annex 2106 in-
corporates the cultural industries exemption of FTA Article
2005(1).04 Cable television broadcasting clearly fits within the
exemption's definition of cultural industries, which includes "all
radio, television and cable broadcasting undertakings and all
satellite programming and broadcast network service."10 5
There are several ways to interpret CMT's allegations that
Canada "violated" NAFTA. The first is that CMT was merely
focusing on different aspects of the agreement. Chapters 11, 12,
and 13 all seem relevant at first glance.' 0 6 Chapter 11 requires
national treatment and MFN for investors from each party,10 7
Chapter 12 requires national treatment and MFN for service
providers from each party, 08 and Chapter 13 requires access to
telecommunications for all parties.'0 9 Cable television is ex-
cluded, however, from the scope of Chapter 13.110 In spite of
these possibly applicable chapters, the cultural exemption ap-
plies "[nlotwithstanding any other provision of [NAFTA]."111
The second possibility is that CMT was attempting to wage
a public relations war. Perhaps CMT believed it would be able
to present its case in a more sympathetic light if it seemed that
Canada had acted unfairly.
Whatever CMT's motivation, its claim that the denial of its
license "discriminate[d] against U.S. firms"112 may have been
accurate, but the denial did not constitute a violation of NAFTA
or the FTA. Likewise, the CRTC's actions did not violate any
NAFTA "provisions that deal with market access for service
providers and the confiscation of investments" as CMT had
101. Rich Brown, CMT Appeals Ruling, BROADCAsTNG & CABLE, Jan. 2,
1995, at 22.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
104. FTA, supra note 21, art. 2005.
105. NAFA, supra note 3, art. 2107(e).
106. Id. chs. 11, 12, and 13.
107. Id. ch. 11.
108. Id. ch. 12.
109. Id. ch. 13.
110. Id. art. 1302 1 1.
111. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2106.
112. Brown, supra note 101.
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claimed. 113 However, CMT's threat that the United States could
"retaliate by restricting imports of Canadian goods and services"
is accurate. 114
FTA Article 2005(2) allows a Party to take measures of
"equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would
have been inconsistent with [FTA, and by extension, NAFTA]
but for [the cultural industries exemptionl."115 Thus, the United
States could retaliate in any number of ways to the CRTC's deci-
sion, as long as the retaliations added up to an "equivalent com-
mercial effect." The United States did threaten to retaliate in
exactly this way, through Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act.
3. Section 301
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act has been a very contro-
versial tool of U.S. trade policy. 116 The principal critique of Sec-
tion 301 is that its unilateral nature is contradictory to the
multilateral goals and structures of the GATT/WTO.117 The
Section 301 proceedings that occurred in the course of the CMT
dispute illustrate a different problem with Section 301: it is
such a powerful tool that it may be easily abused. This abuse
may occur in several forms. Section 301 is so open-ended that it
allows extremely incommensurate retaliation, and its proce-
dures allow it to be abused by individual American companies.
113. CMT Fights Back, supra note 57.
114. CMT to Appeal Against Canadian Ban, Music & COPYRIGHT, Jan. 18,
1995, at 15, available in 1995 WL 9764210.
115. FTA, supra note 21, art. 2005(2).
116. "Of all the U.S. international trade statutes, perhaps none elicits
greater international condemnation than Section 301.... [It has] brought forth
... a 'fusillade of censure' from foreign trade policy officials. One Canadian
official, for example, characterized Section 301 as a 'threat to the central viabil-
ity of the multilateral trade system.'" Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation
for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Sec-
tion 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301, 301 (1990) (citations omitted). For a variety of
critiques and defenses of Section 301, see generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI ET AL.,
Aa GREssrva UNILATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
117. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in
AGGREssIvE UNILATERALISM, supra note 116, at 33-38 (describing Section 301 as
GATT-illegal); Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Re-
taliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 233 (1996) (concluding that the WTO should attempt to circumscribe
the scope of Section 301, because its use is contrary to the goals of the WTO/
GATT). A separate critique of Section 301 is that it violates the principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction that are codified in the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law. Chris Shore, Note, The Thai Copyright Case and Possible
Limitations of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Actions Taken Under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, 23 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 725 (1992).
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Furthermore, its design and immense power make it an inappro-
priate tool (especially when considered in conjunction with its
open-ended nature) for the delicate work of dealing with barriers
to cultural trade.
On December 23, 1994, CMT filed a petition asking the
USTR to initiate a Section 301 action.118 This gave the USTR
forty-five days to decide whether to initiate a Section 301 inves-
tigation. 119 On February 6, well within the time limit, the
USTR announced it was initiating the action.120 The USTR
then had a twelve-month time limit to decide whether it would
use a Section 301 action to respond to the CRTC's actions.121
Section 301(a) provides for mandatory retaliation if a U.S.
international agreement has been violated. In contrast, Section
301(b) allows discretionary action in situations where an agree-
ment has not been technically violated. 122 As shown above, the
action violated neither GATS (or any other GATT/WTO agree-
ment) nor NAFTA/FTA. The retaliation provision contained in
FTA Article 2005(2)123 is an implicit acknowledgment that dis-
cretionary Section 301 actions are a possible response to a cul-
tural restriction.
Discretionary Section 301 actions are available only if the
act, policy, or practice is "unreasonable or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts United States commerce." 124 Mickey Kan-
tor's description of the USTR's approach to the dispute shows
that the action contemplated was discretionary Section 301 ac-
tion: "if the issue is not resolved expeditiously, USTR proposes
to determine that the CRTC practice is unreasonable and consti-
tutes a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce." 25
In addition to determining whether retaliation is appropri-
ate by this standard, the USTR also must decide what type and
amount of retaliation is appropriate. Under Section 301, the
USTR is authorized to suspend any obligations it has under any
trade agreements, 26 and may impose any sort of fee, duty, or
118. USTR Initiates Section 301 Probe, supra note 65, at 267.
119. Section 301, § 2412(a)(2).
120. USTR Initiates Section 301 Probe, supra note 65, at 267.
121. Section 301, § 2414(a)(2)(B). Although the USTR may provide public
hearings in regard to impending Section 301 actions within this 12-month pe-
riod, it did not do so in this case because such a hearing was not requested by
CMT. Id. § 2412(a)(4)(A).
122. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
124. Section 301 § 2411(b)(1).
125. USTR Initiates Section 301 Probe, supra note 65, at 267.
126. Section 301, § 2411(c)(1)(A).
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restriction it determines to be appropriate. 127 The FTA's retali-
ation provision, Article 2005(2), establishes a standard of
"equivalent commercial effect." 128 This constrains the economic
consequences of the retaliatory effect, but does not limit the in-
dustry or sector to which the retaliation is to be applied. Section
301 makes explicit this open-endedness: the USTR may respond
without regard to whether the response targets the same eco-
nomic sector that was originally involved. 129
One answer to the question of how much retaliation is per-
mitted was provided on March 15, 1995, when a group of U.S.-
based cable companies suggested to the USTR that the appropri-
ate level of retaliation should exceed $750 million annually.130
These companies did not specify how they had reached this fig-
ure. CMT had just under two million viewers in Canada as of
Jan. 1, 1995, when it was forced to terminate service. 131 Its an-
nual "cash flow" from Canadian operations was $1.2 million.' 3 2
CMT owner Westinghouse said that the financial impact of the
CRTC's decision was "insignificant."13 3 Retaliation of $750
million seems incommensurate with an "insignificant" $1.2
million.134
As Kantor's June 21, 1995 deadline approached, there was
speculation over which Canadian companies or industries would
be targeted. 13 5 The list of companies expected to face trade
sanctions included Teleglobe, an international telecommunica-
127. Id. § 2411(cXl)(B).
128. FTA, supra note 21, art. 2005(2).
129. Section 301 § 2411(c)(3)(B).
130. U.S. Entertainment Firms Call for Retaliation, supra note 66, at 504.
131. Stilson, supra note 41, at 12.
132. Gaylord Entertainment: Going Global with Country Music, Music &
COPYRIGHT, May 10, 1995, at 12, available in 1995 WL 9764658.
133. Rich Brown, Canada Cans Country Music Television, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, June 20, 1994, at 22.
Lloyd Werner of CMT parent company Group W Satellite Communica-
tions .... says the financial impact of CMTs removal from the Cana-
dian market will be insignificant to GWSC because its current [as of
mid-1994] distribution of 1.9 million cable subscribers in Canada just
barely covers the cost of marketing the service in the country. But
GWSC had long-term growth plans for CMT in Canada that showed
the channel turning a small profit at about 4 million subscribers.
Id.
134. Maury Lane, director of government affairs for Westinghouse, offered
an assessment of the retaliation which is entirely different in scale, but which
presents the same inequity: "'[tihe CMT issue was worth perhaps $100 million
... But this move by Kantor could cost (the Canadian entertainment industry)
multi-billions of dollars.'" Peter Morton, U.S. Draws up Canadian Culture "Hit
List," FIN. POST (Toronto), Feb. 4, 1995, at 3.
135. U.S., Canada Out of Tune, supra note 68, at 27.
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tions company, Cineplex Odeon, a movie theater chain, and
MuchMusic, a music video channel. 13 6 Since the Section 301 ac-
tion was averted at the last minute by the joint-venture agree-
ment, it is unclear how sanctions would be applied to these
companies. However, one example will show the inequality of
treatment that could easily have resulted: if MuchMusic was
excluded from expansion into the U.S. just as CMT was excluded
from Canada, MuchMusic would suffer far more. MuchMusic is
a much smaller service than CMT 13 7 and is owned by a much
smaller corporate parent.'38
Perhaps the most important question facing the USTR was
how the sanctions were going to be implemented. Typically, the
response under Section 301139 is in the form of trade sanctions,
such as imposing a tariff or quota on a product or service. 140 In
this case, the USTR apparently intended to target specific com-
panies. Although trade limitations frequently have a dramatic
136. Id.
137. At the end of 1994, MuchMusic had a total viewership of 6.3 million
(5.8 million in Canada and 500,000 in the U.S.), Lisa Kassenaar, While MTVis
Off Conquering Europe, Canada's Own MuchMusic is Tackling the U.S. Music
Video Network on Its Home Turf, FIN. PosT (Toronto), Oct. 8, 1994, at S9,
whereas CMITs international broadcasts reached more than 25 million viewers
in 22 countries. Gaylord Entertainment, supra note 132, at 12.
138. MuchMusic is run by CHUM Ltd., with total 1996 sales of Canadian
$239 million and a 1996 profit of Canadian $10.25 million. CHUM LIMITED
1996 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1996). On the other hand, CMT owners Gaylord En-
tertainment had total revenues of about $688 million and $63 million profit in
1994, Gaylord Entertainment Income Rises to $63.06 Million in '94, J. REc.(Okl.
City), Feb. 17, 1995, and Westinghouse had roughly $9 billion in revenue for
1995, and its broadcasting division, GWSC, had $303 million in revenue and $9
million in profit just for the month of November 1995. Westinghouse Announces
Fourth Quarter Results, PR NEwswIE, Feb. 8, 1996, available in Westlaw,
Allnewsplus File.
139. More frequently than not, the initiation of Section 301 investigations,
and the mere threat of sanctions, is the impetus that causes the other govern-
ment to capitulate. See, e.g., Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade
Act of 1974, 55 Fed. Reg. 4294 (USTR 1990) (describing resolution of EC "Oil-
seeds" dispute after USTR initiated Section 301 investigation, (which was con-
firmed by a GATT panel report) but before sanctions were actually
implemented). Only seven of forty-eight mandatory Section 301 actions initi-
ated between 1974 and 1992 actually resulted in sanctions being imposed. Alan
0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Relations: The Lim-
ited Case for Sectin 301, 23 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992). As a result,
exactly how sanctions will be implemented is a question that rarely emerges.
140. See, e.g., Determination to Impose Increased Duties on Certain Prod-
ucts of the European Community, 53 Fed. Reg. 53115 (USTR 1988) (describing
the imposition of increased customs duties in the EC "Beef Hormone" case). For
more information on the Beef Hormone case, see Michele Carter, Note, Selling
Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference in the
Growth Hormone Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 625 (1997).
THE COUNTR Y Music TEL,0wsoN DIsP'rE
impact on specific companies, it is unusual to first identify which
individual companies to attack, and then figure out how to do so
within the framework of trade regulations. The method appar-
ently contemplated by the USTR seems more likely to anger a
trading partner than to reach a compromise that works to the
benefit of both countries.
A second approach would be to adopt a non-trade measure,
such as a tax or an administrative procedure or regulation. A
prior Section 301 action, which also involved Canadian televi-
sion broadcasting, provides an example.' 41 In that case, Canada
denied tax deductions to Canadian businesses for television ad-
vertisements on U.S. border stations received in Canada.' 42 The
United States responded not by punishing specific companies,
but by enacting tax legislation that mirrored the Canadian legis-
lation.1 43 This less aggressive non-trade response does not seem
to be a viable way to resolve or even respond to the CMT dis-
pute. In the past, cable television in the U.S. has been subjected
to significant government regulation, but with recent develop-
ments, culminating in the passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996,'" it is now subject to much less regulation. In con-
trast, cable television in Canada has been entirely under the
regulatory control of the CRTC since that organization's incep-
tion. Although U.S. courts have in the past had some success in
mandating that cable television providers carry some types of
content (such as local channels), it is unlikely that the U.S. gov-
ernment could legally prohibit all cable providers from broad-
casting a particular channel. 45 As a result, there seem to be no
non-trade measures available for the United States to pursue.
The final option is to apply sanctions in cultural or en-
tertainment sectors outside cable television broadcasting.146
The USTR, in considering sanctions against film industry com-
141. Presidential Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974: Memorandum for the USTR, 45 Fed. Reg. 51173 (1980).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
145. Even if the U.S. government was in the regulatory mood to try such a
prohibition (which it certainly is not now), the prohibition would probably con-
stitute a prior restraint on speech and thus be nearly per se unconstitutional.
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
146. Sanctions in these sectors could be GATS-illegal, and sanctions in in-
dustries outside of the general cultural industry exception could also be
NAFTA-illegal. For example, Canadian telecommunications company
Teleglobe was rumored to be the subject of possible sanctions in the CMT dis-
pute. Unilateral changes in international telecommunications regulations,
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panies such as Cineplex Odeon, was entertaining this option.
One problem with applying these cross-sector sanctions is the
possibility of arbitrary, abusive application: the U.S. govern-
ment could very easily be used to serve the goals of one or a few
particular American multinational companies. Assume it was
Home Box Office (HBO) instead of CMT that had objected to the
administration of Canadian cable television. HBO's parent com-
pany, Time/Warner, could request as a remedy that compact
discs released by non-American owned record companies should
be subjected to a prohibitively high tariff. Because Time/Warner
is the only major American-owned record label, this would effec-
tively give Time/Warner a monopoly on the entire U.S. record
market.
Admittedly, this hypothetical example is somewhat implau-
sible. However, it is useful because it illustrates another prob-
lem inherent in Section 301 action. The right to retaliate
against the "unfair" actions of their competitors places U.S.
firms in a powerful position, since they can afford to disrupt or
harass their foreign competitors at little cost to themselves. 147
There is simply nothing for an American company to lose in
bringing claims, no matter how unjustified. Furthermore,
.. because the U.S. admini trative agencies that carry out these ac-
tions on the behalf of U.S.-based firms... face no penalty when they
file unjustified actions or false "unfair" trade claims, [the abuse of Sec-
tion 301] create[s] severe repercussions for Canadian exporters to the
United States. [Section 301 action has been] found not only to have
complicated Canada-U.S. relations, but to be one of the leading causes
of trade disruption with other major U.S. trading partners, in particu-
lar Japan. 14
8
The CMT dispute illustrates that Section 301 is, paradoxi-
cally, such a powerful tool that it barely works. The theoretical
flexibility and seemingly unlimited size of sanctions that it offers
are complicated by a number of problems in actual use. Only
one type of sanction (cross-sector) was available, and there is no
check preventing American companies from asking for incom-
mensurate and arbitrary sanctions against their competitors.
Of course, by one standard Section 301 worked perfectly in
this case. CMT eventually obtained 33 percent of what it
wanted, a Canadian broadcast outlet. However, the fact that
which would need to be made to affect Teleglobe, would likely violate the GATS
Annex on Telecommunications.
147. ANDREw D. M. ANDERSON, SEEKING COMMON GROUND: CANADA-U.S.
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the threat of Section 301 action can scare governments into ne-
gotiation does not illustrate that Section 301 is a truly useful
tool. Instead, it only illustrates the unpredictable effect of trade
policy conducted by brute force rather than by diplomacy.
This unpredictability is especially inappropriate when deal-
ing with such a potentially politically sensitive area as cultural
trade. The aggressive response by CMT and the U.S. govern-
ment may even have galvanized more Canadian support for lim-
iting cultural trade than American support for increased
cultural exports.1 49 Canada's cultural trade policy is deeply
rooted and strongly felt, even though U.S. policy does not recog-
nize this. In fact, cultural trade policy is an increasingly crucial
element of international trade, one that the United States
should perhaps approach from a less contentious and simplistic
viewpoint.
B. CANAIAN CuLTuR-AL TRADE POLICY: DISCRIMINATORY
PROTECTIONISM OR THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY?
A U.S. Department of State Dispatch released soon after
Canada's denial of CMT's license is typical of the American re-
sponse to Canadian cultural protectionism:
The CRTC's decision... amounts to nothing less than a confiscation of
CMT's business and will reflect negatively on Canada as a safe place to
invest.... These developments [are] concrete evidence of an increasing
and disturbing trend in Canada toward the implementation of policies
that are intended to protect Canadian industry by discriminating
against legitimate U.S.... interests. 1 50
Around the same time, Canadian ambassador to the United
States Raymond Chr6tien made a series of statements which ex-
emplify Canada's defense of the CRTC decision:
[Flor Canada, trade in cultural goods and services is not just like any
other trade.... There was a strong commitment within the Canadian
government to ensure that our cultural industries are allowed to pro-
gress and develop.., the ability to maintain viable, home-grown cul-
tural industries that tell us about ourselves, is key to our sense of
149. Greg Quill, Country Music TV Deal Capitulation-It's All About Unfin-
ished NAFTA Business, TORONTO STAR, June 23, 1995, at D12, available in
1995 WL 6001410; Jamie Portman, Tuning Out the Twang from U.S. Station,
MowRnAL GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1995, at B3, available in 1995 WL 6941095; Susan
Kastner, Dagnabit. Looks Like We've Ruffled Those Old Yankee Feathers Again,
ToRoNTo STAR, Nov. 6, 1994, at E2, available in 1994 WL 7948424.
150. U.S. Response to Recent Canadian Trade-Related Decisions, supra note
63.
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national identity ... [this commitment] is one thing that Canadian
government policy has consistently recognized.
1 5 1
These two quotes sound the main themes that reverberate
throughout discussions of cultural trade policy.
One of several rationales that have been used to defend poli-
cies against limits on cultural trade is freedom of speech.' 5 2
Limiting cultural trade, it is argued, inhibits the interplay of in-
formation between countries and obstructs the development of a
diversity of viewpoints.' 5 3 Although this argument is probably
true in the abstract, it has to be taken to extremes to actually be
applicable to Canada-United States trade policy. No one could
suggest that there is not already a healthy exchange of ideas
between the United States and Canada. Canada's policies have
neither the purpose nor the effect of making Canada into an-
other North Korea, isolated from the rest of the world by a com-
munications barrier. Instead, they are designed to maintain
limited protection for distinctly Canadian speakers (meaning
film-makers, musicians, and other members of the entertain-
ment industries) who might otherwise be effectively prohibited
from expressing themselves at all. Similarly, although U.S.
free-speech jurisprudence primarily emphasizes the need for the
government to not restrict speech, it does leave room for balanc-
ing that need against other important governmental inter-
ests.' 5 4 In the case of international broadcasting, the interests
of the marketplace of ideas must be balanced against access to
151. Canadian Ambassador Defends Curbs on Imports of U.S. Magazines,
supra note 1, at 178-79.
152. Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MIN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 165, 188 (1995).
153. Id. at 188-90. Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rationale of the First Amendment
is to allow a marketplace of ideas, in which the "best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that "[ilt is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether by the Government itself or a private licensee").
154. [The] tradition [of free-speech jurisprudence] teaches that the
First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to protect
speech from Government regulation through close judicial scrutiny,
thereby enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without imposing
judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that dis-
ables Government from responding to serious problems. This Court, in
different contexts, has consistently held that the Government may di-
rectly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its
regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems with-
out imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.
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the marketplace itself. Although Canada has had basically the
same policies in place since 1968, U.S. entertainment still re-
mains dominant. If the policies had not been in place, there is a
real possibility that Canadian freedom of expression within
Canada would have been diminished.
A second way to analyze Canada's governmental broadcast-
ing policy is to compare it to the U.S. experience with broadcast
regulation. For much of its history, 155 the Federal Comimunica-
tions Commission (FCC) has attempted to maximize the diver-
sity and quality of programming, and keep in check the
monopolistic tendencies of entertainment and media companies,
by giving preference to locally owned broadcasters. 156 The
CRTC likewise pursues the dual objectives of creating diverse
and high quality programming, 157 and restraining the profit-
maximizing behavior of large companies operating in
Canada. 58
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385
(1996). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding limits on an indi-
vidual's expenditures in running for elected office to be unconstitutional re-
straints on speech, and holding that the government's attempt to "enhance" the
speech of weaker parties by suppressing the speech of stronger parties is incor-
rect First Amendment jurisprudence). Buckley v. Valeo has been severely criti-
cized. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 464
(1996) (calling Buckley's rejection of enhancement theory "one of the most casti-
gated passages in modern First Amendment case law"); Cass R. Sunstein, Dx-
MOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 94-101 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1423-25 (1986). Time, place
and manner restrictions on speech, although appropriate only when the restric-
tions are content-neutral, also illustrate this balancing. See Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
155. There have been many recent changes in the FCC's jurisdiction, culmi-
nating in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). However, the FCC and CRTC
still have fundamentally comparable missions and roles in their respective
governments.
156. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINIsTRA-
TWVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY 437-38, 441 (3d ed. 1992).
157. The current Broadcasting Act states that the broadcasting policy of
Canada is to "encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing
a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas,
values and artistic creativity, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment
programming and by offering information and analysis concerning Canada and
other countries from a Canadian point of view...." Broadcasting Act of 1991,
ch. 11, § 3(d)(ii), 1991 S.C. 117 (Can.). The Act also requires that "the program-
ming... should be of high standard...." Id. § 3(g).
158. ROBERT E. BABE, CANADIAN TELEVISION BROADCASTING STRUCTURE,
PERFORMANCE, AND REGULATION 33 (1979). Profit-maximizing, in this context,
is not intended to mean the ordinary attempt to earn reasonable profits that is
the incentive for private broadcast activity. Instead, it is intended to mean
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It could be argued that the above parallels between the FCC
and the CRTC show that CMT should have been allowed to con-
tinue broadcasting, on the rationale that the FCC has histori-
cally done an inconsistent at best job of administering
broadcasting, 5 9 and so the CRTC is probably equally inept.'60
This syllogism fails to take into account the two-step process
used by the FCC in broadcast licensing: it first must decide if the
applicant meets the minimal statutory qualifications, and then
it uses discretionary factors to decide between equally qualified
applicants. 161 The FCC has generally had the most trouble at
the second step. 162 On the other hand, the CRTC's denial of
CMT's continued broadcasting was at the first step: CMT failed
to meet basic Canadian statutory requirements of Canadian
ownership, control, and content. 163
The actions of media mogul Rupert Murdoch illustrate the
importance and simplicity of these threshold requirements. One
of the FCC's statutory thresholds prohibits the ownership of a
broadcasting company in the United States by an alien or alien-
affiliated foreign corporation.' 64 In order to buy U.S. broadcast-
profit-seeking behavior that is excessive to the point of harming the public in-
terest. "[IUt can be deduced that television broadcasters earning very high rates
of return in broadcasting are not providing the public service contemplated by
the Broadcasting Act; the opposite is true." Id.; see also Broadcasting Act § 3.
159. FCC comparative licensing hearings have been described as "unpre-
dictable, excessively discretionary, complex and baffling, deficiently consonant
with the rule of law, and producing results that seem inconsistent from case to
case." Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative
Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1971).
160. Like the FCC (and probably every other administrative agency any-
where), the CRTC has been subjected to severe criticism. See generally HE-
SCHEL HARDIN, CLOSED CIRcurrs (1985) (chronicling the CRTC from its creation
in 1968 through the early 1980s). However, the CRTC's overall success (or lack
thereof) in implementation of its goals does not mean that in any particular
licensing denial (such as CMTs) it has acted incompetently.
161. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 156, at 437-38.
162. Id. at 439-48.
163. Broadcasting Act of 1991, ch. 11, §§ 3(a), (f), 1991 S.C. 117 (Can.). The
CRTC's decision regarding CMT can thus be seen as analogous to the FCC's
decision, in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., to deny a station's license
because it did not meet the minimum guidelines for eligibility. 351 U.S. 192
(1956).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994):
(b) Grant or holding by alien or representative, foreign corporation, etc.
No broadcast.., license shall be granted to or held by-
(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign
government;
(3) any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien of
which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or
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ing network Metromedia, the Australian-born Murdoch became
a U.S. citizen. 165 If the United States' broadcasting policy limits
foreign ownership, it seems strange that American companies
should find Canada's similar requirements unfair.
Furthermore, the CRTC has to consider an additional goal
with which the FCC is not concerned. In addition to preventing
profit-maximizing behavior by individual companies, 166 the
CRTC must also protect Canada from what it perceives to be an
even more threatening monopoly: the American entertainment
industry. Just as American broadcasting policy historically has
preferred local ownership and control, Canada's cultural trade
policy can be seen as an attempt to prefer local (Canadian)
broadcasters over a larger, external conglomerate.
It has been strongly argued that the FCC's strategy of em-
phasizing local broadcasting may have been implemented in
such a way as to actually inhibit programming diversity. 167 If
so, then one might assume that Canada's strategy of emphasiz-
ing local (i.e., Canadian) broadcasters would have a similar par-
adoxical effect. However, a strategy and its implementation are
not the same. The fact that the FCC's emphasis of local (mar-
ket-by-market) ownership of broadcast media may not have
worked does not necessarily mean that an emphasis on local
(Canadian) ownership will not work. The reasons why the
FCC's emphasis on local ownership (concern with the limited
broadcast spectrum, and on the distribution sector rather than
the transmission sector of the industry)168 may have created re-
sults opposite of those desired simply do not exist when "local"
voted by aliens or their representatives... or by any corporation or-
ganized under the laws of a foreign country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the direc-
tors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is
owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives ... or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Com-
mission finds that the public interest will be served by the refusal or
revocation of such a license.
Id.
165. William H. Meyers, Murdoch's Global Power Play, N.Y. TiMEs, June 12,
1988, at 19.
166. See BABE, supra note 158, at 33.
167. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal
Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415, 1482 (1996).
168. See id. at 1428-29. The creation and packaging of marketable goods
and services is the transmission sector, and the delivery of that content to con-
sumers is the distribution sector. This distinction is applicable in regulated
industries ranging from natural gas to entertainment.
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means Canadian, and when technological advances continually
widen the broadcasting spectrum.
Perhaps the chief American argument against cultural pro-
tectionism is that it is nothing more than disguised economic
protectionism. Michael Jay Solomon, President of Warner
Brothers International Television Distribution, has stated "[tihe
cultural argument is bullshit. . . [aill people in television care
about is ratings and profit."169 This argument (although usually
not so crassly expressed) is based on the premise, acknowledged
by all, that cultural industries are big business. For example,
Ian Morrison, spokesperson for the Friends of Canadian Broad-
casting, estimates that the benefit to private Canadian televi-
sion broadcasters and networks from federal protectionist
policies is around Canadian $200 million.170
However, just because cultural industries are big business
does not mean that they are just like any other industry. In a
general sense, the objective of free trade is economic efficiency.
The best example of how free trade achieves this objective is the
"Law of Comparative Advantage." 17' The Law of Comparative
Advantage only works, however, if one assumes that goods and
labor can be quantified into consistent monetary units. To begin
with, services of all types are more difficult than goods to quan-
tify this way. 172 The fundamental flaw in this economic analy-
sis, though, is that it assumes that economic decisions are made
169. Ken Auletta, TV's New Gold Rush, NEW YoRKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 88.
170. Van Harpen, supra note 152, at 174. Another example of this economic
impact, from the EC, is French Communications Minister Alain Carignon's esti-
mate that free trade in cultural industries would jeopardize 50,000 jobs and 50
billion French Francs ($8.5 billion) in revenue for television and film alone. Id.
at 177.
171. The Law of Comparative Advantage posits that countries will, and
should, export products in which they have production advantages relative to
their trading partners, and import products in which they have production dis-
advantages. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-34 (5th
ed. 1973). Since Canada is, by any standard, disadvantaged relative to the U.S.
in the production of entertainment, the Law of Comparative Advantage sug-
gests that it should just give up.
172. [Q]uality is the only yardstick by which to measure the value of a
service, and quality depends on the manner in which each particular
service act is performed. [Thus, tihere may be no such thing as a stan-
dard of service, let alone a standard unit of service, which constitutes a
uniform valuation basis for each particular service activity. If that is
so, .. . due to the fact that both output and price vary from one service
act to another, there is no sound basis to calculate the productivity of
any given service activity.
Jacques Nusbaumer, Some Implications of Becoming a Services Economy, in
COMMUNICATION REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL BusnEss 23, 27 (Juan F.
Rada & G. Russell Pipe eds., 1984).
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rationally. The value of a television program cannot be deter-
mined by identifying the cost of production or the price at which
the viewing of the show is sold to the end viewer. In the en-
tertainment industry, more than in perhaps any other, produc-
tion and consumption decisions are made irrationally. 173
Aesthetic sensibilities, hype, and escapism are far more likely to
influence television viewing sensibilities than reasoned choices
made on the intrinsic "worth" of the program. 174 The law of
comparative advantage does not make sense in a choice between
an American television broadcast, such as CMT, and a Canadian
one, such as MuchMusic, because the products simply can not be
logically compared. 175 In sum, although limits on cultural trade
have a large economic impact, it is overly simplistic to argue
that the broad economic argument behind maximizing free trade
applies to cultural trade.
Another group of arguments in favor of removing cultural
trade restrictions between the United States and Canada is
based on-a less sweeping economic analysis, asking how the Ca-
nadian entertainment industry would be affected if restrictions
were no longer in effect. For example, it has been argued that
imported American entertainment supports the Canadian local
173. "[There is in the entertainment business] a creative process in which
artistic vision is subjective and unpredictable. The clash between 'art' and
'commerce'is a constant theme.., for the artistic value of any entertainment
property or talent is mostly subjective." DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND
BusINEss OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 265 (3d ed. 1996). Because the
value of entertainment property is so subjective, there is no objective way to
comprehensively measure the entire societal value of a television program,
song, or film. It is not hard to think of examples of entertainment that have had
a societal impact far beyond their value at the cash register, such as the music
of Bob Dylan or the broadcast of the Apollo 11 lunar landing.
174. Ordinarily, a necessary service is highly valued to the consumer and
can be highly profitable to the producer. However, public television and arts
funding programs, well established in both Canada and the U.S., exist because
in many situations no producer will find it profitable to provide what the con-
sumer needs. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1994) (stating that the purposes for
the establishment of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting include ". . . to
encourage the development of programming that involves creative risks and
that addresses the needs of unserved audiences and underserved audiences").
175. The argument that the two programs could be compared by airing them
simultaneously in the same market and comparing their ratings does not work,
because there is no logical rationale that can be used to explain why a viewer
would prefer one over the other. If the value of entertainment lay only in its
apparent economic value as measured by ratings, there would be no reason for
protecting entertainment or culture under the First Amendment. Canada and
the United States both recognized long ago that expression, including en-
tertainment, has an intangible value that is worth protecting even when it of-
fers no economic benefit.
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entertainment industry, because the low cost of American en-
tertainment products, such as films and television shows, allows
broadcasters to stay in business, giving local producers a means
with which to disseminate their more expensive product.176 A
similar argument is that the reduction of protection will lead lo-
cal producers to specialize, which is economically more produc-
tive and efficient. 177
However, both of these arguments have major flaws. From
an economic standpoint, the idea of using cheap imported en-
tertainment to, in effect, subsidize more expensive domestic en-
tertainment only makes sense if there are content quotas-if
there are not, any rational broadcaster will soon find it even
cheaper to use only the imported entertainment. 17  A related
problem is that because increased specialization brings with it
diminished flexibility and market power, a Canadian commu-
nity of specialist producers will find that it is unable to assert
itself in the international marketplace the way the more unified
and integrated American film and record industries do. The ul-
timate result of increased specialization will be diminished com-
petition in the North American and world marketplaces.
Maintaining competition in the entertainment industry is
especially important for three reasons: the industry has an in-
herent trend towards monopolization; the ongoing revolution in
communication technology will be most easily exploited by large
companies; and most importantly, these industries are of unpar-
alleled importance in the culture of individual nations, and of
the world.
American entertainment industries have a long history of
monopolistic behavior. 179 This historical trend is reinforced by
176. Van Harpen, supra note 152, at 183-84.
177. Id. at 184-85.
178. The imbalance of programming costs, and entertainment production
generally, between the United States and Canada is partially due to the fact
that the United States is currently the largest audience in the world in which
nearly the entire population shares a common language. Canada has one-tenth
the population of the United States and a bilingual audience, and there are
many major language groups within the EC. Because U.S.-based entertain-
ment companies can recover the large fixed production costs of making televi-
sion programming and films, and other entertainment in their domestic
market, they are able to sell their entertainment at variable-cost prices that
non-U.S. producers cannot match.
179. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502 (1917) (invalidating a film cartel's attempt to condition the distribu-
tion of film projectors upon an agreement to exclusively show the company's
films); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC regulations
designed to prevent market-dominating practices by radio networks); United
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current market reality. The production and distribution of en-
tertainment exhibit economies of scale,180 and thus the en-
tertainment industry can be thought of as a "natural
monopoly".""' Finally, from the Canadian perspective, although
the American entertainment industry consists of eight or ten
large but fiercely competitive companies, these companies all
produce the same product (non-Canadian entertainment). It
seems logical that the Canadian government would intervene
when confronted with a market saturated with an undesired
product.
The ongoing technological revolution in entertainment and
communications has been used as an argument against cultur-
ally protective policies such as Canada's. In this view, communi-
cation advances allow producers to circumvent protectionist
barriers, and if the barriers are futile, why have them at all? 8 2
Like the free speech argument, this only makes sense if one as-
sumes that total protectionism is the desired goal. Cultural
trade barriers like Canada's, even though semi-permeable, still
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (prohibiting a movie
studio's attempt to condition access to its copyrighted films only upon "block-
booking" of its films in local theater); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962) (reaching the same result).
180. Only a few companies can "amass sufficient capital to acquire, organ-
ize, deliver, and promote the constant stream of new programming needed to
satisfy an easily bored public." Chen, supra note 167, at 1489.
181. [Natural monopolies exist] when there is a relation between the
size of the market and the size of the most efficient firm in that market
such that one firm of efficient size can produce all the market can ab-
sorb at a remunerative price and can continually expand its capacity at
less cost than that of a new firm entering the business.
BREYER & STEwART, supra note 156, at 236. The entertainment industry
(broadly encompassing film, music, television, and publishing) fits this descrip-
tion. In each sector, there are seven or fewer monolithic firms that are verti-
cally integrated from the production of the content through at least most of the
distribution chain, and in film and music, the costs of starting a new company
to compete with the "majors" has effectively prohibited the creation of any com-
petitors in at least twenty years. Although three new television networks have
been started in the last 10 years, none of them represent the entry of a new
start-up competitor-they instead exemplify the trend that has dominated the
entertainment industry for years: increased integration and mergers. See BIED-
ERMAN, supra note 173, at 3-5, 527, 556-57, 602-03, 627-28. The net effect of
this increased integration is that there are perhaps a dozen really big firms that
control the entertainment industry, and that operate on such a large and diver-
sified scope that no new firm could possibly hope to compete with them. "Local
distribution of power, gas, water, telephone, and perhaps CATV [cable televi-
sion] service still tend to be considered natural monopolies." BREYER & STEW-
ART, supra note 156, at 236 (emphasis added).
182. See generally Van Harpen, supra note 152, at 181 (describing the im-
pact of changing technology on cultural industries).
Mi8 J GLOBAL TRADE
achieve their purpose: to provide a limited degree of protection,
enough to shelter Canada's own cultural industries.'83
In fact, the limited protection offered by Canada's cultural
trade policy is even more important in light of the quasi-monop-
olistic nature of the American entertainment industry and cur-
rent advances in communications and other technology. New
distribution systems, whether they be satellite communications
or cable internet systems, require massive investments to imple-
ment.'8 4 Thus, the larger a company is, the better situated it is
to take advantage of technological advances. At this late date,
there can be no doubt that those who are able to take advantage
of these advances will control the future of entertainment and
communications.' 8 5 It should come as no surprise, then, to com-
panies engaged in international cultural trade that Canada has
made it a national priority to try to save itself a lane on the in-
formation superhighway by shielding its entertainment indus-
try from domination.
Thus, even if Canadian cultural industries are currently
maintaining their tenuous position, technological change makes
it important for the CRTC to keep a vigilant watch toward the
future. Whoever controls the communications and entertain-
ment networks of the future will control the terms of speech, ex-
erting an ever-widening influence.' 86 This is ultimately the
danger about which the Canadian government is concerned:
they want to protect their cultural industries because they see
them as inextricably linked to their culture and its future.' 8 7
183. See, e.g., Bill Brownstein, Canadians in Cultural Denial; World Loves
Our Performers but the Federal Government is What Helps them Flourish, Or-
TAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 6, 1996, at C7.
184. At the 1994 launch of its Full Service Network (an experimental inter-
active television service) in Orlando, Time Warner announced that it had com-
mitted $5 billion to upgrade its cable systems over the next five years to allow
movie-viewing, shopping, games, and telephone services via a "souped-up cable
box and television set". Eben Shapiro, Time Warner Cites Role of Movies, Ads in
Interactive Project, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at B8.
185. See Chen, supra note 167, at 1490-91.
186. Id.
187. (Canadian] Broadcast Strategy recognizes that the tide of techno-
logical change cannot be stopped nor will simple reliance on barriers
suffice. Even if Canadians wanted to, we could never build walls high
enough to stop a flood that is coming from the sky alone.' 'But many
Canadians have also recognized that something very precious-our
heritage, our cultural identity, our sense of ourselves as a national
community would be lost if their enhanced choice of programming does
not include the creation of new programs by Canadians.'
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A surprisingly common response to this argument is that
there is no such thing as Canadian culture.188 The obvious eth-
nocentrism manifested in non-Canadians passing judgment on
the worth or very existence of Canadian culture eliminates this
argument from having to be taken seriously.' 8 9 A slightly more
plausible argument asks why Canada has chosen to protect its
culture by regulating television, instead of something more tra-
ditionally "cultural," like literature. The simple answer is that
television can have enormous force on society. Great numbers of
people watch television' 90 for great periods of time,191 and one
Jake V. Th. Knoppers, A Perspective From Canada, in COMMUNICATION REGULA-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 93, 100-01 (Juan F. Rada & G. Russell Pipe
eds., 1984) (emphasis and quotation marks in original).
188. Jay Berman, CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America
(the lobbying organization for the six major record labels), did not help his
cause when he told the following joke on a Canadian radio show: "What's the
difference between yogurt and Canada? Yogurt has an active culture." Ben
Wildavsky, Culture Clashes, 28 NAT'L J. 648 (1996); see also Nina Munk, Cul-
ture Cops, FORBES, Mar. 27, 1995, at 42, 43 (asserting that Canadian efforts to
protect Canadian culture are mere economic protectionism, on the basis that
"it's hard to pinpoint anything distinctly Canadian").
189. There are... those on the American side of the border who can
find no distinguishable Canadian cultural artifact that is definitively
unique in relation to those produced in the rest of Northern America.
It must be even more difficult for technocrats, industrialists, and pol-
icy-laden bureaucrats on both sides of the invisible border to recognize
what is real to those who maintain a national consciousness and iden-
tity, who identify themselves as Canadian in terms of their collective
existence as a nation, and, individually, through the cultural indus-
tries. Perhaps the differences between the two societies could be seen
more readily if Canadian products were as available south of the bor-
der as American products are north of it.
Laurence S. Seidenberg, Canadian Cultural Identity and Copyright Law: The
Signal-Piracy Imbroglio After the Free Trade Agreement, in BORDERLANDS: ES-
SAYS IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 263, 282 (Robert Lecker ed., 1991).
Similarly, Raymond A.J. Chrdtien, Canadian ambassador to the United States,
has asked:
Would you accept as a country to have 90 percent of everything shown
on your television screens coming from another country?... Would you
accept half the penetration that we accept in Canada of foreign cul-
tural products in our country? If the situation was reversed, I think
there would be a huge outcry.
Wildavsky, supra note 188, at 650.
190. In 1990, more than 7 million Canadians (roughly one-quarter of Can-
ada's population) subscribed to cable television. CANADiN RADIO-TELEVISION
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CRTC YAR IN REvrEw 1990-1991, 71
(1991). In the U.S., 62.1 million households subscribed to cable television in
1996. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, FCC Order No. 96-496 (1996) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
191. In 1990, each Canadian 2 years old or older viewed an average of 23.3
hours of television weekly. CRTC YEAR IN REviw, supra note 190, at 18.
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only has to consider events such as the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy de-
bate and the coverage of Operation Desert Storm to realize tele-
vision's dramatic impact.192  Because broadcasting and
communications have traditionally been areas of regulation, and
because of this enormous impact, television is a natural means
for the implementation of cultural protection.
CMT contends that "[clountry music videos reflect the best
elements of American culture .... No political messages, no gra-
tuitous sex or violence, just good music."193 In other words,
CMT asks "Why, of all the programming that comes into Canada
from the U.S., ban us?" The answer is that the value of any indi-
vidual program or cultural service lies in the eye of the con-
sumer. Of course CMT thinks their programming is the best.
The real question is what programming does Canada think is
best, and the CRTC answered that it was not CMT.
C. BALANCING CULTURE AND COMMERCE
The CMT dispute demonstrates the problems that both gov-
ernments and international agreements have with cultural
trade policy. The WTO system, which has yet to explicitly ad-
dress the problem, offers no guidance as to how to arrive at a
resolution. NAFTA's asymmetrical cultural exemption is not a
solution, but is instead an ongoing sore spot in Canada-U.S. re-
lations. Section 301, the United States' primary tool in attempt-
ing to resolve the dispute, also poses problems. It can too easily
be applied so as to serve every interest except a mutually satis-
factory resolution, and its brute force is just as likely to irritate
trade partners as it is to lend to an amicable compromise.
192. The power of television in Canadian political and cultural life is
powerfully illustrated in the story of Canada's adoption of a Bill of Rights.
Throughout the 1970s, Canadian television broadcast many American police
dramas in which officers read Miranda rights to the criminals they appre-
hended. Despite the entirely different constitutional and political system of
Canada at that time, many Canadians grew to believe that they had "the right
to remain silent, the right to counsel," and all the other protections existing
under the U.S. Constitution. When Canada re-adopted its Constitution in the
process of cutting governmental ties with the U.K., it added an American-style
Bill of Rights. This was, at least in part, because so many Canadians had al-
ready assumed that they had such rights. GEORGE H. QUESTER, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL POLrnIcs OF TELEVISION 109-10 (1990); see also Kaplan, supra note 25, at
257-59 (explaining the theory of'la t6l6vision toute-puissante'-the all powerful
television).
193. This was said by GWSC's Lloyd Werner about CMTs expansion into
Europe, but it applies equally to their expansion into Canada. Jack Hurst, On
the Road Again: Nashville Artists Find New Nations to Conquer, Cm. TEiB.,
July 26, 1996, § 5 (Tempo), at 1.
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The dispute also illustrates Canada's commitment to a sen-
sible cultural policy, uncomfortable as that policy and commit-
ment may be to the United States. What can be done to try to
balance the interests of both Canada and the United States?
One option would be to adopt, at the WTO level, an agree-
ment providing for some degree of cultural protection. The
number of nations asserting their rights to protect their domes-
tic culture industries is rising, as is their determination to do so
vigorously.' 94 At the same time, the U.S. entertainment indus-
try is increasingly looking abroad for growth.195 A well-crafted
multilateral agreement could allow both sides to compromise.
Canada, the EC, and others could offer the United States certain
sectors or types of culture or entertainment in which there
would be open trade in exchange for United States accession to
the agreement.
There is precedent in the VTO system for such a compro-
mise. The WTO provides exclusions for industries such as de-
fense 196 and government procurement. 197 Furthermore, it
already provides an exclusion somewhat linked to a country's
culture, the public morals exception of GATT Article XX(a). 1 98
All of these exceptions allow a country to determine what is in
its own best interest in issues that it feels are central to its iden-
tity and sovereignty. If Canada, the EC, and others strongly feel
that the importation of American cultural products endangers
their national identities, or even sovereignty, that concern
should be treated just as these other central concerns have been.
194. BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 173, at 6.
195. For example:
CMT Latin America took flight in 1995, making CMT International's
satellite signals available to more than 90% of the television house-
holds in the world. The next step is to build the base of households
that are actually receiving CMT .... We are very enthusiastic about
country music's reception around the world and CMT International's
potential for growth.... [W]e believe the international market is large
enough that the investment we make today will be paid back in the
years to come. We remain committed to CMT International and its
goal of taking country music-America's music-to the world. We be-
lieve this is in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders
for the long term.
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT CoMPANY, INc., supra note 47, at 15.
196. GATT art. XXI.
197. Agreement on Government Procurement, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 4, reproduced as
amended in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTs 438 (1995).
198. GATT art. XX(a).
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A second solution is just to scale back the level of disagree-
ment through voluntary corporate behavior. Some Canadian
broadcast networks have grown, thanks to the CRTC's policies,
large enough to be competitive in the international market-
place. 199 MuchMusic, one of the leaders of Canadian broadcast-
ing's nascent export movement, attributes its growth and
success to its concern for local content.200 In Argentina,
MuchMusic began operations with 80% Canadian content and
20% local content, and then worked with the local broadcaster to
reach a goal of 50% Canadian, 50% local broadcasting. 20 1 Many
Canadian broadcasters believe that this sensitivity to local cul-
tural concerns, instilled by surviving in the shadow of the
United States, has made Canadian television exporting more
flexible and thus more profitable.20 2
This approach may not work in all situations, but it is one
that the United States entertainment industry may find it prof-
itable to try. Perhaps if CMT had played more Canadian coun-
try artists in the first place, there would have been no
complaints at the CRTC hearing.
CONCLUSION
The compromise ultimately reached between CMT and its
Canadian co-venturers was a resolution that both sides could
live with. However, it came with dramatic cost to CMT, consum-
ers, and the Canadian country-music artists who were boy-
cotted. Furthermore, the dispute caused the once relatively
dormant issue of cultural trade protection to surface, unnecessa-
rily creating international tension and illustrating the problems,
for both the United States and Canada, that are inherent in the
current system of agreements and laws dealing with cultural
trade protection. Canada and the United States should seek to
use the lessons learned from the CMT dispute to develop a com-
promise to this ongoing trouble spot in their relations.
199. Tony Atherton, TV Nation; World Tunes in Canada's Television Set,
OrrAWA CrrZEN, June 30, 1995, at B1. In 1994, Canada exported Canadian
$300 million of television programming. Id. This made it a distant second in
the world to the United States. Id. In 1993, U.S. exports of all visual media
(movies, television, and home video) totaled approximately $18 billion. David J.
Fox, Entertainment Industry Gets Clinton's Free Trade Pledge, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1993, at D5.
200. Atherton, supra note 199, at B1.
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Although Canada is particularly susceptible to American
cultural exports, most of the United States' other trading part-
ners face the same issue: how to balance the desire to protect
their own entertainment and cultural sovereignty with the de-
sire to minimize barriers to trade to benefit their citizens and
the global entertainment industry. Ever-quickening technologi-
cal change, increasing centralization of ownership, and the drive
of the entertainment industry to expand across the globe will
increasingly cause this issue to be important in international
political and economic relations. Thus, there are lessons from
this dispute for all governments concerned about their econo-
mies and cultures.

